Monday, September 28, 2026

Fences/Boundaries and Reform



“In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, ‘I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.’ To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: ‘If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.’”

- G.K. Chesterton, from The Thing: Why I am Catholic

Friday, September 18, 2026

The "Legitimacy" of the Novus Ordo: A Legitimate Question


By François Savy

In his article [When Will There Be Liturgical Peace?], published in the July–August 2025 issue (No. 382) of La Nef, Christophe Geffroy posed a question that has taken on particular significance in light of the recent episcopal consecrations within the Priestly Fraternity of St. Pius X. He argued there for the equality in “value and holiness” of the two forms of the Roman Rite, and reproached “priests who refuse any celebration of the novus ordo” for challenging this value and holiness “because they consider this liturgy ‘deficient.’” Now, it happens that the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith has expressly mentioned the “legitimacy of the Novus Ordo Missae” in the preamble to the procedure allowing clergy of the Society of St. Pius X to return to full communion after the consecrations.

As far as I can judge, this notion of legitimacy when applied to the liturgy is of relatively recent usage. We were familiar with the classical notions of validity and liceity. It was Pope John Paul II who appears to have introduced it, through the Congregation for Divine Worship, with Quattuor abhinc annos (October 3, 1984), which made the following a condition for granting the indult:


“that it be made quite clear that these priests and faithful have nothing whatsoever to do with those who question the legitimacy and doctrinal rectitude of the Roman Missal promulgated by Pope Paul VI in 1970, and that their position be without any ambiguity and publicly recognized.”

One must conclude that these conditions were not so easy to fulfill, since Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre made the following commitments in the [Protocol of Agreement of May 5, 1988]:


“3. Concerning certain points taught by the Second Vatican Council or concerning the subsequent reforms of the liturgy and of canon law, which seem to us difficult to reconcile with Tradition, we commit ourselves to having a positive attitude of study and communication with the Apostolic See, avoiding all polemics.We furthermore declare that we recognize the validity of the Sacrifice of the Mass and of the Sacraments celebrated with the intention of doing what the Church wishes and according to the rites indicated in the typical editions of the Missal and of the Rituals of the Sacraments promulgated by Popes Paul VI and John Paul II.”

In these commitments, there is no trace of any legitimacy that would have to be recognized as belonging to the Novus Ordo Missae. Yet this Protocol of Agreement was the foundation upon which the relationship between the Priestly Fraternity of St. Peter and Rome was established from the beginning. The commitments made by Archbishop Lefebvre, and accepted on behalf of the Holy Father by Cardinal Josef Ratzinger, constitute the common foundation of the societies of apostolic life or Ecclesia Dei communities—at least of the three “historic” ones, the Priestly Fraternity of St. Peter, the Fraternity of St. Vincent Ferrer, and the Abbey of Sainte-Madeleine du Barroux—in their relationship with Rome. In simple justice, one should require of them only recognition of the validity of the Sacrifice of the Mass according to the new liturgy, and even then, only according to the typical editions.

What Josef Ratzinger, Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, had accepted in 1988, Pope Benedict XVI could not subsequently call into question. Thus it was not the motu proprio Summorum Pontificum (July 7, 2007) that would bring the question of legitimacy back onto the table, but rather the instruction implementing the motu proprio, dated April 30, 2011, in Article 19:


“The faithful who ask for the celebration of the extraordinary form must never assist or belong to groups that deny the validity or legitimacy of the Holy Mass or of the Sacraments celebrated according to the ordinary form […]”

Thus, with the instruction implementing the motu proprio Summorum Pontificum, the question of the legitimacy of the new liturgy returned after an eclipse of twenty-three years. Obviously, Article 19 could not fail to raise questions about what meaning should be assigned to “legitimacy,” and therefore questions in the form of dubia addressed to the Commission. [The response of the Pontifical Commission Ecclesia Dei, dated May 23, 2012 (ref. Prot. 156/2009)], consisted in affirming that legitimacy was to be understood as strictly equivalent to liceity. This was obviously a minimalist response, and the most conciliatory solution—the one that avoided casting into outer darkness all the troublesome people of my ilk who, despite all their efforts and all their good will, using their senses and their intelligence, could not bring themselves to follow the leveling demands.

It is therefore quite logically and unsurprisingly that the motu proprio Traditionis Custodes, taking up the question of legitimacy in Article 3, drove the point home on July 16, 2021:


“The bishop, in dioceses where until now there exist one or more groups that celebrate according to the Missal antecedent to the reform of 1970 […] is to ascertain that these groups do not deny the validity and legitimacy of the liturgical reform, the decrees of the Second Vatican Council and the Magisterium of the Supreme Pontiffs.”

It is not imputing a motive to Pope Francis to imagine that he had in mind a definition of legitimacy much less pacifying than that of simple liceity, to which the Commission had claimed to equate it in 2012: the general tenor of the document, its tone, reveal a much more restrictive understanding, and paradoxically a more traditional one, despite its serious weaknesses—the injustice of the intention that presided over its drafting, its partial inapplicability resulting from its inconsistencies, and its legal irrationality.

And if he had then affirmed that the legitimacy of the Novus Ordo Missae, far beyond mere liceity, ought to be judged according to its conformity to the objective Common Good of the Holy Church, well, we would have been in complete agreement with him, particularly with regard to the Lex Credendi—he deserves credit for recalling this connection between the law of prayer and the law of Faith. It is equally certain that with Traditionis Custodes, those who resist of my sort once again ran the risk, after years of relative impunity, of being cast out.

The Protocol of Agreement of 1988 shows us, if this were necessary, that the two signatories—and, one imagines, John Paul II himself—either admitted at least the possibility of a deficiency in the new rite, or did not regard it as inappropriate or absurd to debate the matter. Apparently, neither signatory saw this as an attack upon the dogma of the indefectibility of the Church.

That the Novus Ordo Missae presents “deficiencies in its liturgical being,” to use a phrase dear to a certain Father of Chémeré-le-Roi, can be demonstrated, and it is reasonable to maintain. Others, much more eminent, beginning with Cardinals Ottaviani and Bacci, have undertaken to do so, and there is no need to return to the matter here. Let us retain the Offertory, degraded into a mere presentation of the gifts; the substitution of numerous and unequal Eucharistic Prayers for a sacrificial prayer (the Canon); and the modification of the words of the consecration (words and ritual context). All these elements objectively contribute to obscuring nothing less than the dogma of the Real Presence of Christ, the oblation and immolation of His redemptive (propitiatory) sacrifice, and finally the sacramental ministerial power of the priest, or even to suggesting an erroneous understanding of them. The consequences? The Novus Ordo Missae disposes souls less well to receive all the fruits of the divine sacrifice; it diminishes the witness of Faith and the manifestation of the glory of God required by every liturgical action, while leaving the door open to a Protestant interpretation. Anthropocentric, and centered upon the presence of the faithful, it expresses less clearly the sacrificial, propitiatory, and cultic dimensions of the Mass and the adoration of God to whom the sacrifice is offered—to restrict ourselves to the case of the minister celebrating according to the typical editions. A very concrete illustration of the effects of this deficiency and ambiguity was provided by an American study on belief in the Real Presence.

Thus, to put it cautiously, it is defensible to say that the Novus Ordo contributes less powerfully and less surely than the usus antiquior or other venerable rites, such as the Dominican Rite, to the Common Good of the Church (which is ordered toward the Glory of God and the sanctification of souls). It is equally defensible to say that the Novus Ordo is not the result of an organic development, but rather the product of the work of scholars and experts, the fruit of an anti-liturgical process: if the manner in which a rite is developed were made a criterion of its legitimacy, the Novus Ordo would fail the test. As the future Benedict XVI wrote:


“the new missal was published as a work revised by professors and not as a moment of continuous growth. Nothing like this had ever happened […]”

At this point, we must face this reality: contrary to the view of Christophe Geffroy, Father Spriet, or Dom Pateau, it is reasonable and defensible to maintain an inequality in value and holiness between the two Roman rites, the old and the new. It is reasonable and defensible to regard the Novus Ordo as deficient, and even ambiguous in its liturgical being, without for a second contesting its validity—which, if taken to its logical conclusion, would lead to denying the indefectibility of the Church. It is reasonable and defensible for a priest to absolutely refuse to celebrate it—and even to concelebrate—and to argue accordingly. Those who enjoy the canonical protection of the proper charism of their society of apostolic life or institute of membership should remember that this protection was obtained by their founders on the theological basis of a critique of the liturgical deficiencies of the Novus Ordo; and it is reasonable and prudent that, where appropriate, they argue the case on these grounds. It is reasonable and defensible for an ordinary member of the faithful to habitually refrain from attending a Novus Ordo Mass.

This position is legitimate. For my part, I shall maintain it.

François Savy
Español
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Here is the original French article.

De François Savy :

Dans son article À quand la paix liturgique ?, dans la livraison de juillet-août 2025 (n°382) de La Nef, Christophe Geffroy posait une question à laquelle les sacres récemment conférés au sein de la Fraternité Sacerdotale Saint-Pie X donnent un relief particulier. Il s’y faisait l’avocat de l’égalité en « valeur et sainteté » des deux formes du rite romain, et y reprochait aux « prêtres qui refusent toute célébration du nouvel ordo » de contester cette valeur et cette sainteté « parce qu’ils jugent cette liturgie ‘’déficiente’’ ». Or, il se trouve que le Dicastère pour la Doctrine de la Foi a précisément mentionné la « légitimité du Novus Ordo Missae » en préambule de la procédure permettant aux clercs de la Fraternité Saint-Pie X de revenir à la pleine communion après les sacres (2026-07-02-Prassiriconciliazione.pdf).

Autant que je puisse en juger, cette notion de légitimité appliquée à la liturgie est d’un usage relativement récent. On connaissait les notions classiques de validité et de licéité. C’est le pape Jean-Paul II qui semble l’avoir introduite, par la voix de la Congrégation pour le Culte divin, avec Quattuor abhinc annos (3 octobre 1984), posant comme condition à la faculté d’user de l’indult


« qu’il soit bien clair que ces prêtres et ces fidèles n’ont rien à voir avec ceux qui mettent en doute la légitimité et la rectitude doctrinale du Missel Romain promulgué par le Pape Paul VI en 1970 et que leur position soit sans aucune ambiguïté et publiquement reconnue. »

Il faut croire que ces conditions n’étaient pas si simples à remplir, puisque Monseigneur Marcel Lefebvre prenait ces engagements dans le protocole d’accord du 5 mai 1988 :


« 3. A propos de certains points enseignés par le Concile Vatican II ou concernant les réformes postérieures de la liturgie et du droit, et qui nous paraissent difficilement conciliables avec la Tradition, nous nous engageons à avoir une attitude positive d’étude et de communication avec le Siège Apostolique, en évitant toute polémique.

4. Nous déclarons en outre reconnaître la validité du Sacrifice de la Messe et des Sacrements célébrés avec l’intention de faire ce que veut l’Eglise et selon les rites indiqués dans les éditions typiques du Missel et des Rituels des Sacrements promulgués par les Papes Paul VI et Jean-Paul II. »

Dans ces engagements, il n’y a point de trace d’une quelconque légitimité qu’il faudrait reconnaître au Novus Ordo Missae. Or, ce protocole d’accord est le fondement sur lequel s’est établi dès l’origine la relation entre la Fraternité Sacerdotale Saint-Pierre et Rome. Ces engagements pris par Monseigneur Lefebvre, et acceptés au nom du Saint Père par le cardinal Josef Ratzinger constituent le socle commun des sociétés de vie apostolique ou communautés Ecclesia Dei, aux moins des trois « historiques », Fraternité Sacerdotale Saint-Pierre, Fraternité Saint-Vincent Ferrier, abbaye Sainte-Madeleine du Barroux, dans leur rapport avec Rome. En bonne justice, on ne devrait exiger d’elles que la reconnaissance de la validité du Sacrifice de la Messe selon la liturgie nouvelle, et encore, uniquement selon les éditions typiques.

Ce que Josef Ratzinger, cardinal de la Sainte Église romaine avait accepté en 1988, le Saint Père Benoît XVI ne pouvait le remettre en cause. Ce n’est donc pas le motu proprio Summorum Pontificum (7 juillet 2007) qui va remettre sur la table la question de la légitimité, mais bien l’instruction d’application du motu proprio en date du 30 avril 2011 en son article 19 :


« Les fidèles qui demandent la célébration de la forme extraordinaire ne doivent jamais venir en aide ou appartenir à des groupes qui nient la validité ou la légitimité de la Sainte Messe ou des sacrements célébrés selon la forme ordinaire […] ».

Ainsi, avec l’instruction d’application du motu proprio Summorum Pontificum, la question de la légitimité de la liturgie nouvelle faisait son retour après une éclipse de 23 ans. Évidemment, cet article 19 ne pouvait pas manquer de susciter des interrogations sur le sens à donner à « légitimité », et donc des questions en forme de dubia adressée à la Commission. La réponse de la CPED, en date du 23 mai 2012 (ref. Prot. 156/2009), a consisté à affirmer que la légitimité était à comprendre comme strictement équivalente à la licéité. C’était évidemment une réponse minimaliste et la solution la plus conciliante, celle qui évitait de rejeter dans les ténèbres extérieures tous les fâcheux de mon acabit qui, malgré tous leurs efforts et toute leur bonne volonté, usant de leurs sens et de leur intelligence, ne pouvaient se résoudre à suivre les injonctions égalisatrices.

C’est assez logiquement et sans surprise que le motu proprio Traditionis Custodes, reprenant la question de la légitimité à son compte en son article 3, enfonçait donc le clou le 16 juillet 2021 :


L’évêque, dans les diocèses où jusqu’à présent se trouvent un ou plusieurs groupes qui célèbrent avec le Missel antérieur à la réforme de 1970 […] doit veiller à ce que ces groupes n’excluent pas la validité et la légitimité de la réforme liturgique, des écrits du concile Vatican II et du Magistère pontifical ;

Ce n’est pas faire un procès d’intention au pape François que d’imaginer qu’il avait en tête une définition beaucoup moins pacificatrice de la légitimité que celle de la simple licéité, à laquelle la Commission avait prétendu l’assimiler en 2012 : la teneur générale du document, son ton, laissent transparaître une compréhension beaucoup plus restrictive, et paradoxalement plus traditionnelle, en dépit de ses graves faiblesses – injustice de l’intention qui a présidé à sa rédaction, inapplicabilité partielle résultant de ses incohérences, irrationnalité juridique (cf. Le motu proprio Traditionis Custodes à l’épreuve de la rationalité juridique – Réginald-Marie Rivoire).

Et, s’il avait alors affirmé que la légitimité du Novus Ordo Missae, bien au-delà de la simple licéité, devait être jugée à l’aune de son adéquation au Bien Commun objectif de la Sainte Église, eh bien, nous aurions été en plein accord avec lui, notamment au regard de la Lex Credendi – il a eu ce mérite de rappeler ce lien entre la loi de la prière et la loi de la Foi. Il est tout aussi certain qu’avec Traditionis Custodes, les réfractaires de mon espèce couraient à nouveau, après des années de relative impunité, le risque d’être mis au ban.

Le protocole d’accord de 1988 nous montre, s’il en était besoin, que les deux signataires, et, on l’imagine, Jean-Paul II lui-même, soit admettaient ne serait-ce que la possibilité d’une déficience du rite nouveau, soit ne considéraient pas comme inconvenant et absurde d’en débattre. Aucun des signataires n’y voyait, apparemment, d’atteinte au dogme de l’indéfectibilité de l’Église.

Que le Novus Ordo Missae présente des « déficiences dans l’être liturgique », pour utiliser une formule chère à un certain père de Chémeré-le-Roi, il est possible de le montrer, et raisonnable de le soutenir. D’autres, bien plus éminents, à commencer par les cardinaux Ottaviani et Bacci (on pourra également lire ceci avec profit, repris de LA PENSÉE CATHOLIQUE N°122 du 4ème trimestre 1969), s’y sont employés, et il n’est pas besoin d’y revenir. Retenons l’offertoire, dégradé en simple présentation des dons, la substitution de – nombreuses et inégales – prières dites eucharistiques à une prière sacrificielle (le canon), la modification des paroles de la consécration (mots et contexte rituel). Tous ces éléments contribuent objectivement à estomper rien de moins que le dogme de la présence réelle du Christ, l’oblation et l’immolation de son sacrifice rédempteur (propitiatoire), et enfin le pouvoir sacramentel ministériel du prêtre, voire à en insinuer une compréhension erronée. Les conséquences ? Le Novus Ordo Missae dispose moins bien les âmes à recevoir tous les fruits du sacrifice divin, il diminue le témoignage de la Foi et la manifestation de la gloire de Dieu requis par toute action liturgique, en laissant la porte ouverte à une interprétation protestante. Anthropocentré, axé sur la présence des fidèles, il exprime moins les dimensions sacrificielle, propitiatoire et cultuelle de la messe et l’adoration de Dieu à qui le sacrifice est offert – pour s’en tenir au cas du ministre célébrant selon les éditions typiques. Une illustration très concrète des effets de cette déficience et de cette équivocité en a été fournie par une étude américaine sur la croyance en la Présence Réelle.

Ainsi, pour le dire prudemment, il est soutenable de dire que le Novus Ordo contribue moins puissamment et moins sûrement que l’usus antiquior ou d’autres rites vénérables, tel le rite dominicain, au Bien Commun de l’Église (ordonné à la Gloire de Dieu et à la sanctification des âmes). Et il l’est tout autant de dire que le Novus Ordo n’est pas le résultat d’un développement organique, mais bien le produit d’un travail de savants et d’experts, le fruit d’un processus anti-liturgique : si l’on faisait du mode d’élaboration d’un rite un critère de sa légitimité, le Novus Ordo échouerait à passer le test. Comme l’écrit le futur Benoît XVI,


« le nouveau missel a été édité comme un ouvrage revu par des professeurs et non comme le moment d’une croissance continue. Jamais rien de pareil ne s’était produit […] » (in Théologie de la liturgie – Parole et silence, p. 556).

Parvenu à ce point, il faut se rendre à cete évidence : contre l’avis de Christophe Geffroy, de l’Abbé Spriet ou encore de Dom Pateau, il est raisonnable et défendable de tenir l’inégalité en valeur et en sainteté des deux rites romains, l’ancien et le nouveau. Il est raisonnable et défendable de tenir le Novus Ordo pour déficient, et même équivoque dans son être liturgique, sans contester une seconde sa validité – ce qui, en tirant le fil, conduirait à nier l’indéfectibilité de l’Église. Il est raisonnable et défendable, pour un prêtre, de refuser absolument de le célébrer – et même de concélébrer – et d’argumenter en ce sens. Ceux qui bénéficient de l’abri canonique du charisme propre de leur société de vie apostolique ou institut d’appartenance doivent se souvenir qu’il a été obtenu par leurs fondateurs sur la base théologique d’une critique des déficiences liturgiques du Novus Ordo ; et il est raisonnable et prudent qu’ils argumentent le cas échéant en ce sens. Il est raisonnable et défendable, pour un simple fidèle, d’écarter de manière habituelle l’assistance à une messe Novus Ordo. Cette position est légitime. Pour ma part, je la tiendrai.

François Savy







Sunday, September 13, 2026

Honor is the Lord's: 16 Sunday Post-Pentecost: Luke 14:11


Every one that exalteth himself, shall be humbled; and he that humbleth himself, shall be exalted. Luke 14:11

Plinthos question today to ChatGPT

Give me citations where Aquinas best explains the real value of worldly honors in the Aristotelean sense.

ChatGPT answer (with some minor Plinthos editing)

Regarding Aquinas's nuanced position that honor is genuinely a good—and indeed the greatest of external goods—but is still radically subordinate to virtue, the good of reason, and, above all, to God, to Jesus Christ Who is God!, there are several exceptionally good passages.


The Thomistic hierarchy of goods

Aquinas's position can be represented approximately like this:

God (Jesus Christ)/ ultimate beatitude
↓
Virtue and the good of reason
↓
Great virtuous action
↓
Honor as the fitting human recognition/reward of virtue
↓
Nobility, power, wealth, reputation, position, etc.
↓
Pleasure and other lesser external goods

The crucial point is that honor sits at the top of the external hierarchy. It is not merely another worldly bauble.

And yet:

honor < virtue

because honor is valuable precisely insofar as it testifies to excellence, while virtue is the excellence itself.

That distinction is absolutely central to Aquinas.

The three passages I'd put at the top of your reading list

  1. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 129, a. 1 — What is magnanimity concerned with?
    → Honor is the greatest of external goods.
  2. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 129, a. 8 — Does good fortune contribute to magnanimity?
    → Wealth, power, friends, etc. are instruments of virtuous action.
  3. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, lect. 8, §§742–756
    → Probably the fullest and clearest statement of the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of honor, dignity, wealth, power, and social esteem.

If you are interested specifically in worldly rank—nobility, titles, offices, reputation, social precedence, political power, and the honor due to distinguished men, the Ethics commentary §§752–756 is especially rich: Aquinas explains why these things have real objective value without becoming the measure of a man's true worth.

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The single best place for the Thomist position is Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 129, on magnanimity, especially Articles 1, 2, and 3.

1. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 129, a. 1 — Honor is the greatest external good

Aquinas gives the Aristotelian position almost verbatim:

“Honor autem est in se quoddam bonum, et maximum inter exteriora bona.”
“Honor is in itself a certain good, and the greatest among external goods.”

He then explains why honor has this exceptional status: it is connected with virtue, is offered to God and to the excellent, and is something for which men will sacrifice other external goods.

More fully, Aquinas says:

“Honor est praemium virtutis.”
“Honor is the reward of virtue.”

And he explicitly cites Aristotle's Ethics I and VIII for this proposition.

This is important: Aquinas does not Christianize Aristotle by simply dismissing worldly honor as vanity. He accepts the Aristotelian judgment that honor has a real objective value.


2. II-II, q. 129, a. 3 — The crucial distinction: honor is good, but virtue is greater

This is probably the most important passage for your question.

Aquinas asks whether the magnanimous person is concerned with honors. His answer is that honor is indeed the matter of magnanimity, but the magnanimous man does not treat honor as his supreme good.

He writes:

“The things which come into man's use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply.”

Why?

“because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue.”

And:

“in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things.”

That is a very Aristotelian observation: honor is objectively important because it is society's recognition of excellence.

But then Aquinas makes the hierarchy unmistakable:

“man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God.”

Thus even the greatest human honor cannot adequately recompense genuine virtue.


3. II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 3 — The perfect attitude toward honor

This is perhaps the best short passage if you're interested in the proper psychological attitude toward worldly distinction.

Aquinas says that the magnanimous man:

“is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them”

and is likewise

“not cast down by dishonor.”

Notice the subtlety. He doesn't say:

“Honor is worthless.”

Rather:

Honor is genuinely valuable, but it is not valuable enough to dominate the soul.

That is the Aristotelian mean elevated into Aquinas's Christian moral theology.


4. II-II, q. 129, a. 2 — Honor is connected with great deeds

Aquinas explains that magnanimity concerns great honor because it concerns great virtue:

“as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue.”

Consequently:

“the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue”

precisely insofar as he aims at what is worthy of great honor.

This is extremely Aristotelian. The desire for honor is not intrinsically corrupt. The problem is whether one desires honor in accordance with reality—that is, in proportion to one's actual excellence.


5. Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, lect. 8, §§742–757

This is actually the most explicit exposition of the Aristotelian doctrine, because Aquinas is commenting directly on Aristotle rather than integrating the doctrine into the Summa.

The key statement is:

“Huiusmodi autem est honor… Unde manifestum est quod honor est optimum inter omnia exteriora bona.”

Literally:

“Such is honor … Hence it is manifest that honor is the best among all external goods.”

Aquinas gives three reasons implicit in Aristotle's argument:

  1. honor is given to God (in Jesus Christ, Who is He);
  2. honor is especially sought by people in positions of dignity;
  3. honor is the reward of virtuous actions.

Therefore honor is the summum of external goods, while nevertheless remaining an external good.

This is the passage I would recommend most strongly if you are studying Aquinas's Aristotelian conception of worldly dignity, rank, reputation, and honor.


6. The really fascinating passage: external goods actually help virtue

Aquinas goes farther than merely saying that worldly goods are permissible.

In his commentary on Ethics IV, he writes:

“Ipsa etiam bona fortunae organice deserviunt ad operationes virtutum.”

That is:

“The goods of fortune themselves serve organically/instrumentally for the operations of virtue.”

And he specifically identifies nobility, power, and wealth as goods which can contribute to magnanimity.

Why?

Because these things can make a person genuinely capable of performing great actions.

Aquinas therefore distinguishes:

external excellence → genuine instrument for virtue

from:

external excellence → substitute for virtue.

The first is legitimate; the second is a corruption.

He puts it very sharply:

“Sed secundum rei veritatem solus bonus, idest virtuosus, est honorandus.”

“But according to the truth of the matter, only the good man, that is, the virtuous man, ought to be honored.”

That sentence gives you Aquinas's entire hierarchy in miniature.


7. II-II, q. 129, a. 8 — External goods are instruments

This is another exceptionally important text. Aquinas asks whether goods of fortune—wealth, power, friends, etc.—contribute to magnanimity.

His answer:

“goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.”

And his reason is twofold:

  • they increase the honor a person receives;
  • they are “useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds.”

Aquinas gives the concrete examples of:

“riches, power and friends.”

Then comes the crucial qualification:

“Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.”

That is an extraordinarily useful Thomistic formulation.

Virtue does not need worldly goods in order to be virtue.
But virtue can make better use of worldly goods when they are available.


8. Aquinas's treatment of ambition — II-II, q. 131, a. 1

This question is particularly useful because it prevents us from interpreting Aquinas's magnanimity as simple indifference to public recognition.

Aquinas begins the question on ambition by presenting the objection:

“Honor autem de se quoddam bonum est, et maximum inter exteriora bona.”

“Honor in itself is a certain good, and the greatest among external goods.”

And therefore, he says, those who do not care about honor at all can themselves be reproved.

That's a very important Aristotelian point.

The Thomistic ideal is not aphilotimia—a pathological inability to value honor.

Nor is it ambitio—an excessive appetite for honor.

It is magnanimitas: the correct estimation and use of great honor.


9. One particularly beautiful Aristotelian passage: honor vs. virtue

In Aquinas's commentary on Ethics IV, lect. 8, §744, he explains that no human honor is actually sufficient to repay virtue:

“The good of reason, for which virtue is praised, exceeds all external goods.”

Yet the virtuous man doesn't reject honor because it is worthless. Rather, he accepts whatever honor is given because:

“men have nothing better to give him.”

That is probably the most elegant expression of the entire doctrine.

Human honor is real, appropriate, and worthy of desire in its proper order—but it remains an inadequate earthly recompense for virtue.

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If you are interested specifically in worldly rank—nobility, titles, offices, reputation, social precedence, political power, and the honor due to distinguished men, the Ethics commentary §§752–756 is especially rich: Aquinas explains why these things have real objective value without becoming the measure of a man's true worth.

P.S. The image is due to the Summer showers we had here today, during the sermon, at the Academy where I preach. The sermon message is that every man is simply an aqueduct for every good thing God gives him. All of the honor and glory to the Lord! He drenches us with every good thing, natural and supernatural, for His glory, the glory of Jesus Christ our God!

Sunday, September 6, 2026

If God is Dead, We Killed Him! --Nietzsche


You have undoubtedly heard the worn out cliche "God is dead." But you have probably never heard it quoted in context:

"God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!"

"Gott ist todt! Gott bliebt todt! Und wir haben ihn getödtet!"

We are God's murderers. He did not die a natural death. He was violently killed, a ritual sacrifice, the Cross, Calvary, for the sins of the world. Nietzsche himself, so often misquoted, even he, is a witness to the fact of God's absence from the world and from our lives because of our middle-class "morality," our false religion, even our fake Christianity.

Cf. "The Founding Murder in the Philosophy of Nietzsche" in Rene Girard, All Desire is a Desire for Being, Penguin Classics, 2023, 21-40. Girard interprets all of human reality in terms of mimesis, violent social and individual rivalry and ritual expiation of a scapegoat, wrongly deemed accountable for our sins; except Christ and His Cross which reverses the age old problem by God Himself becoming the innocent victim, the scapegoat deemed innocent.

Hebrews 9:11-15 But Christ, being come an high priest of the good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle not made with hand, that is, not of this creation: Neither by the blood of goats, or of calves, but by his own blood, entered once into the holies, having obtained eternal redemption. For if the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of an heifer being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing of the flesh: How much more shall the blood of Christ, who by the Holy Ghost offered himself unspotted unto God, cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God? And therefore he is the mediator of the new testament: that by means of his death, for the redemption of those transgressions, which were under the former testament, they that are called may receive the promise of eternal inheritance.


Here is the full Nietzsche passage from The Joyful Wisdom, Book III.

125.

The Madman.—Have you ever heard of the madman who on a bright morning lighted a lantern and ran to the market-place calling out unceasingly: "I seek God! I seek God!"—As there were many people standing about who did not believe in God, he caused a great deal of amusement. Why! is he lost? said one. Has he strayed away like a child? said another. Or does he keep himself hidden? Is he afraid of us? Has he taken a sea-voyage? Has he emigrated?—the people cried out laughingly, all in a hubbub. The insane man jumped into their midst and transfixed them with his glances. "Where is God gone?" he called out. "I mean to tell you! We have killed him,—you and I! We are all his murderers! But how have we done it? How were we able to drink up the 168sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun? Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? Has it not become colder? Does not night come on continually, darker and darker? Shall we not have to light lanterns in the morning? Do we not hear the noise of the grave-diggers who are burying God? Do we not smell the divine putrefaction?—for even Gods putrefy! God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife,—who will wipe the blood from us? With what water could we cleanse ourselves? What lustrums, what sacred games shall we have to devise? Is not the magnitude of this deed too great for us? Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it? There never was a greater event,—and on account of it, all who are born after us belong to a higher history than any history hitherto!"—Here the madman was silent and looked again at his hearers; they also were silent and looked at him in surprise. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, so that it broke in pieces and was extinguished. "I come too early," he then said, "I am not yet at the right time. This 169prodigious event is still on its way, and is travelling,—it has not yet reached men's ears. Lightning and thunder need time, the light of the stars needs time, deeds need time, even after they are done, to be seen and heard. This deed is as yet further from them than the furthest star,—and yet they have done it!"—It is further stated that the madman made his way into different churches on the same day, and there intoned his Requiem aeternam deo. When led out and called to account, he always gave the reply: "What are these churches now, if they are not the tombs and monuments of God?"—

Nietzsche, Friedrich

125

[126] Der tolle Mensch. – Habt ihr nicht von jenem tollen Menschen gehört, der am hellen Vormittage eine Laterne anzündete, auf den Markt lief und unaufhörlich schrie: »Ich suche Gott! Ich suche Gott!« – Da dort gerade viele von denen zusammenstanden, welche nicht an Gott glaubten, so erregte er ein großes Gelächter. Ist er denn verlorengegangen? sagte der eine. Hat er sich verlaufen wie ein Kind? sagte der andere. Oder hält er sich versteckt? Fürchtet er sich vor uns? Ist er zu Schiff gegangen? ausgewandert? – so schrien und lachten sie durcheinander.[126] Der tolle Mensch sprang mitten unter sie und durchbohrte sie mit seinen Blicken. »Wohin ist Gott?« rief er, »ich will es euch sagen! Wir haben ihn getötet – ihr und ich! Wir alle sind seine Mörder! Aber wie haben wir dies gemacht? Wie vermochten wir das Meer auszutrinken? Wer gab uns den Schwamm, um den ganzen Horizont wegzuwischen? Was taten wir, als wir diese Erde von ihrer Sonne losketteten? Wohin bewegt sie sich nun? Wohin bewegen wir uns? Fort von allen Sonnen? Stürzen wir nicht fortwährend? Und rückwärts, seitwärts, vorwärts, nach allen Seiten? Gibt es noch ein Oben und ein Unten? Irren wir nicht wie durch ein unendliches Nichts? Haucht uns nicht der leere Raum an? Ist es nicht kälter geworden? Kommt nicht immerfort die Nacht und mehr Nacht? Müssen nicht Laternen am Vormittage angezündet werden? Hören wir noch nichts von dem Lärm der Totengräber, welche Gott begraben? Riechen wir noch nichts von der göttlichen Verwesung? – auch Götter verwesen! Gott ist tot! Gott bleibt tot! Und wir haben ihn getötet! Wie trösten wir uns, die Mörder aller Mörder? Das Heiligste und Mächtigste, was die Welt bisher besaß, es ist unter unsern Messern verblutet – wer wischt dies Blut von uns ab? Mit welchem Wasser könnten wir uns reinigen? Welche Sühnefeiern, welche heiligen Spiele werden wir erfinden müssen? Ist nicht die Größe dieser Tat zu groß für uns? Müssen wir nicht selber zu Göttern werden, um nur ihrer würdig zu erscheinen? Es gab nie eine größere Tat – und wer nur immer nach uns geboren wird, gehört um dieser Tat willen in eine höhere Geschichte, als alle Geschichte bisher war!« – Hier schwieg der tolle Mensch und sah wieder seine Zuhörer an: auch sie schwiegen und blickten befremdet auf ihn. Endlich warf er seine Laterne auf den Boden, daß sie in Stücke sprang und erlosch. »Ich komme zu früh«, sagte er dann, »ich bin noch nicht an der Zeit. Dies ungeheure Ereignis ist noch unterwegs und wandert – es ist noch nicht bis zu den Ohren der Menschen gedrungen. Blitz und Donner brauchen Zeit, das Licht der Gestirne braucht Zeit, Taten brauchen Zeit, auch nachdem sie getan sind, um gesehn und gehört zu werden. Diese Tat ist ihnen immer noch ferner als die fernsten Gestirne – und doch haben sie dieselbe getan!« – Man erzählt noch, daß der tolle Mensch desselbigen Tages in verschiedene Kirchen eingedrungen sei und darin sein Requiem aeternam deo angestimmt habe.[127] Hinausgeführt und zur Rede gesetzt, habe er immer nur dies entgegnet: »Was sind denn diese Kirchen noch, wenn sie nicht die Grüfte und Grabmäler Gottes sind?«

Wednesday, September 2, 2026

Teenage Daughter with a Phone Is Itself Child Molestation


An underage girl (or boy) with a technological device for communication is alone! That circumstance is already a violation of your young daughter, any random male having access to exclusive communication with her, one-on-one, on her devise. That, in itself, is child molestation.

Solus cum sola non dicunt ave.

The ubiquitous personal pocket phone is a violation of the person. It is a gross invasion of privacy that all one's calls and information be exclusively attached to oneself and thus identifiable. Once a guy contacts your underage daughter alone that is always a big red flag!

Here is a huge reason we, as a society, should bring back the public phones, beginning in the home. Get rid of the private devices! Have maximum one phone per household, and, preferably, no internet service on that device, no wi-fi in the home. Collect books, and promote the public computers again (e.g. in the local library, senior center, in the schools and other public buildings.) And let everyone use the family phone!

Every hotel, every airport should have courtesy computers and public phones available to be used anonymously and free of charge.

Our technology is ever more manipulating us. It may be OK to possess some things, but our things should never possess us! We should never become theirs!
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