Sunday, September 13, 2026

Honor is the Lord's: 16 Sunday Post-Pentecost: Luke 14:11


Every one that exalteth himself, shall be humbled; and he that humbleth himself, shall be exalted. Luke 14:11

Plinthos question today to ChatGPT

Give me citations where Aquinas best explains the real value of worldly honors in the Aristotelean sense.

ChatGPT answer (with some minor Plinthos editing)

Regarding Aquinas's nuanced position that honor is genuinely a good—and indeed the greatest of external goods—but is still radically subordinate to virtue, the good of reason, and, above all, to God, to Jesus Christ Who is God!, there are several exceptionally good passages.


The Thomistic hierarchy of goods

Aquinas's position can be represented approximately like this:

God (Jesus Christ)/ ultimate beatitude
↓
Virtue and the good of reason
↓
Great virtuous action
↓
Honor as the fitting human recognition/reward of virtue
↓
Nobility, power, wealth, reputation, position, etc.
↓
Pleasure and other lesser external goods

The crucial point is that honor sits at the top of the external hierarchy. It is not merely another worldly bauble.

And yet:

honor < virtue

because honor is valuable precisely insofar as it testifies to excellence, while virtue is the excellence itself.

That distinction is absolutely central to Aquinas.

The three passages I'd put at the top of your reading list

  1. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 129, a. 1 — What is magnanimity concerned with?
    → Honor is the greatest of external goods.
  2. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 129, a. 8 — Does good fortune contribute to magnanimity?
    → Wealth, power, friends, etc. are instruments of virtuous action.
  3. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, lect. 8, §§742–756
    → Probably the fullest and clearest statement of the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of honor, dignity, wealth, power, and social esteem.

If you are interested specifically in worldly rank—nobility, titles, offices, reputation, social precedence, political power, and the honor due to distinguished men, the Ethics commentary §§752–756 is especially rich: Aquinas explains why these things have real objective value without becoming the measure of a man's true worth.

__

The single best place for the Thomist position is Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 129, on magnanimity, especially Articles 1, 2, and 3.

1. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 129, a. 1 — Honor is the greatest external good

Aquinas gives the Aristotelian position almost verbatim:

“Honor autem est in se quoddam bonum, et maximum inter exteriora bona.”
“Honor is in itself a certain good, and the greatest among external goods.”

He then explains why honor has this exceptional status: it is connected with virtue, is offered to God and to the excellent, and is something for which men will sacrifice other external goods.

More fully, Aquinas says:

“Honor est praemium virtutis.”
“Honor is the reward of virtue.”

And he explicitly cites Aristotle's Ethics I and VIII for this proposition.

This is important: Aquinas does not Christianize Aristotle by simply dismissing worldly honor as vanity. He accepts the Aristotelian judgment that honor has a real objective value.


2. II-II, q. 129, a. 3 — The crucial distinction: honor is good, but virtue is greater

This is probably the most important passage for your question.

Aquinas asks whether the magnanimous person is concerned with honors. His answer is that honor is indeed the matter of magnanimity, but the magnanimous man does not treat honor as his supreme good.

He writes:

“The things which come into man's use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply.”

Why?

“because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue.”

And:

“in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things.”

That is a very Aristotelian observation: honor is objectively important because it is society's recognition of excellence.

But then Aquinas makes the hierarchy unmistakable:

“man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God.”

Thus even the greatest human honor cannot adequately recompense genuine virtue.


3. II-II, q. 129, a. 3, ad 3 — The perfect attitude toward honor

This is perhaps the best short passage if you're interested in the proper psychological attitude toward worldly distinction.

Aquinas says that the magnanimous man:

“is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them”

and is likewise

“not cast down by dishonor.”

Notice the subtlety. He doesn't say:

“Honor is worthless.”

Rather:

Honor is genuinely valuable, but it is not valuable enough to dominate the soul.

That is the Aristotelian mean elevated into Aquinas's Christian moral theology.


4. II-II, q. 129, a. 2 — Honor is connected with great deeds

Aquinas explains that magnanimity concerns great honor because it concerns great virtue:

“as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue.”

Consequently:

“the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue”

precisely insofar as he aims at what is worthy of great honor.

This is extremely Aristotelian. The desire for honor is not intrinsically corrupt. The problem is whether one desires honor in accordance with reality—that is, in proportion to one's actual excellence.


5. Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, lect. 8, §§742–757

This is actually the most explicit exposition of the Aristotelian doctrine, because Aquinas is commenting directly on Aristotle rather than integrating the doctrine into the Summa.

The key statement is:

“Huiusmodi autem est honor… Unde manifestum est quod honor est optimum inter omnia exteriora bona.”

Literally:

“Such is honor … Hence it is manifest that honor is the best among all external goods.”

Aquinas gives three reasons implicit in Aristotle's argument:

  1. honor is given to God (in Jesus Christ, Who is He);
  2. honor is especially sought by people in positions of dignity;
  3. honor is the reward of virtuous actions.

Therefore honor is the summum of external goods, while nevertheless remaining an external good.

This is the passage I would recommend most strongly if you are studying Aquinas's Aristotelian conception of worldly dignity, rank, reputation, and honor.


6. The really fascinating passage: external goods actually help virtue

Aquinas goes farther than merely saying that worldly goods are permissible.

In his commentary on Ethics IV, he writes:

“Ipsa etiam bona fortunae organice deserviunt ad operationes virtutum.”

That is:

“The goods of fortune themselves serve organically/instrumentally for the operations of virtue.”

And he specifically identifies nobility, power, and wealth as goods which can contribute to magnanimity.

Why?

Because these things can make a person genuinely capable of performing great actions.

Aquinas therefore distinguishes:

external excellence → genuine instrument for virtue

from:

external excellence → substitute for virtue.

The first is legitimate; the second is a corruption.

He puts it very sharply:

“Sed secundum rei veritatem solus bonus, idest virtuosus, est honorandus.”

“But according to the truth of the matter, only the good man, that is, the virtuous man, ought to be honored.”

That sentence gives you Aquinas's entire hierarchy in miniature.


7. II-II, q. 129, a. 8 — External goods are instruments

This is another exceptionally important text. Aquinas asks whether goods of fortune—wealth, power, friends, etc.—contribute to magnanimity.

His answer:

“goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.”

And his reason is twofold:

  • they increase the honor a person receives;
  • they are “useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds.”

Aquinas gives the concrete examples of:

“riches, power and friends.”

Then comes the crucial qualification:

“Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.”

That is an extraordinarily useful Thomistic formulation.

Virtue does not need worldly goods in order to be virtue.
But virtue can make better use of worldly goods when they are available.


8. Aquinas's treatment of ambition — II-II, q. 131, a. 1

This question is particularly useful because it prevents us from interpreting Aquinas's magnanimity as simple indifference to public recognition.

Aquinas begins the question on ambition by presenting the objection:

“Honor autem de se quoddam bonum est, et maximum inter exteriora bona.”

“Honor in itself is a certain good, and the greatest among external goods.”

And therefore, he says, those who do not care about honor at all can themselves be reproved.

That's a very important Aristotelian point.

The Thomistic ideal is not aphilotimia—a pathological inability to value honor.

Nor is it ambitio—an excessive appetite for honor.

It is magnanimitas: the correct estimation and use of great honor.


9. One particularly beautiful Aristotelian passage: honor vs. virtue

In Aquinas's commentary on Ethics IV, lect. 8, §744, he explains that no human honor is actually sufficient to repay virtue:

“The good of reason, for which virtue is praised, exceeds all external goods.”

Yet the virtuous man doesn't reject honor because it is worthless. Rather, he accepts whatever honor is given because:

“men have nothing better to give him.”

That is probably the most elegant expression of the entire doctrine.

Human honor is real, appropriate, and worthy of desire in its proper order—but it remains an inadequate earthly recompense for virtue.

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If you are interested specifically in worldly rank—nobility, titles, offices, reputation, social precedence, political power, and the honor due to distinguished men, the Ethics commentary §§752–756 is especially rich: Aquinas explains why these things have real objective value without becoming the measure of a man's true worth.

P.S. The image is due to the Summer showers we had here today, during the sermon, at the Academy where I preach. The sermon message is that every man is simply an aqueduct for every good thing God gives him. All of the honor and glory to the Lord! He drenches us with every good thing, natural and supernatural, for His glory, the glory of Jesus Christ our God!

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